Cyber Mercenaries: A New Threat to National Security by da Cruz, José de Arimatéia & Pedron, Stephanie
International Social Science Review 
Volume 96 Issue 2 Article 3 
Cyber Mercenaries: A New Threat to National Security 
José de Arimatéia da Cruz 
Stephanie Pedron 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr 
 Part of the Anthropology Commons, Communication Commons, Economics Commons, Geography 
Commons, International and Area Studies Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Public Affairs, 
Public Policy and Public Administration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
da Cruz, José de Arimatéia and Pedron, Stephanie () "Cyber Mercenaries: A New Threat to National 
Security," International Social Science Review: Vol. 96 : Iss. 2 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol96/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Social Science Review by an authorized editor of Nighthawks Open 
Institutional Repository. 
Cyber Mercenaries: A New Threat to National Security 
Cover Page Footnote 
José de Arimatéia da Cruz, PhD/MPH is a Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics 
at Georgia Southern University, Savannah, GA. He is also a Research Professor at the U.S. Army War 
College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA and a Research Fellow of the Brazil Research Unit at the 
Council on Hemispheric Affairs in Washington, DC. Stephanie Pedron is a Political Science graduate 
student at Georgia Southern University. 
This article is available in International Social Science Review: https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol96/
iss2/3 
Cyber Mercenaries: A New Threat to National Security 
 
The birth of the Internet on October 29, 1969, propelled the world into an era of rapid 
technological development and structural innovation that  fundamentally altered the way 
individuals and governments interact. Originally funded and designed by the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (ARPA)—a branch of the U.S. Department of Defense—today’s Internet 
generates an entire virtual landscape of information storage, processing, and communication that 
has been adopted by organizations and societies around the globe.1 It has become an 
international pillar for commerce and networking. However, this electronic medium or 
“cyberspace” that a chunk of the world now operates on presents several security implications 
for private entities and nation-states. 
Since the Internet’s emergence outside of academic institutions, governments realized its 
underlying potential for intelligence-gathering and power projection across vast distances. 
Increased interconnectivity and information-sharing have a multitude of benefits. At the same 
time, they create cross-domain challenges that make nations, organizations, and individuals more 
vulnerable. According to Alexander Keith, a retired U.S. Army general and former director of 
the National Security Agency, Jamil Jaffer, Founder and Executive Director of the National 
Security Institute, and Jennifer Brunet, Director of Product & Strategy at IronNet Cybersecurity,  
Cyberspace has become a digital battleground where nation-states and their 
 proxies, organized criminal groups, terrorists, hacktivists, and others seek to  
 gain an advantage over one another… today the spread of advanced technologies  
 and the increased connectivity of networked devices to physical systems make it  
 more possible than ever before to create real-world effects through cyber activities.”2  
 
Warfare constantly changes. Strategies adapt to suit the situation and technology of the 
times. Accordingly, the Internet transformed the way nations conduct war. Cyber warfare is a 
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novel sphere of conflict that does not require geographic proximity between an attacker and their 
intended target. This ability to remotely cause harm introduced a degree of suspicion on the 
global stage. That cyber-attacks are dependent on the expertise of a group or even a single 
individual offers additional concerns. Tim Maurer, co-director of the Cyber Policy Initiative and 
a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues that, “The diffusion of 
power to an individual level is perhaps the most salient (if not unique) aspect of cyberspace 
compared to other security areas… an individual hacker can emerge as a cyber-power, one 
whose relative isolation, anonymity, and small footprint is a source of strength.”3 Those adept at 
exercising cyber warfare are capable of gross damage to a nation’s infrastructure, from shutting 
down electrical grids and defense systems to stealing the personal information of millions of 
“netizens.” Cyberspace has made it easier for competitors to remotely access the information 
networks of other societies and affect the operation of essential public and private institutions.4 
There is no universal definition of what constitutes a cyber mercenary and current 
literature related to the topic is limited. Depending on one’s perspective, a cyber mercenary can 
be a freedom fighter or a common thug renting his or her expertise to the highest bidder. Tim 
Maurer, in his book Cyber Mercenaries: The State, Hackers, and Power, presents a novel way of 
thinking about the dynamic between nation-states and their proxies,5 although he does not clearly 
define the term cyber mercenary. Sitara Noor, in her article, “Cyber (In)Security: A Challenge to 
Reckon With” offers a basic description of cyber mercenary based on a dictionary definition of 
the traditional mercenary—that is, “a cyber mercenary can be defined as an individual or a group 
of experts who can offer their skills to anyone who will pay them a good amount of money.”6 
Beginning with the common meaning of a word is helpful, but Noor’s description neither places 
cyber mercenaries within the realm of cyber space, nor considers the selling of cyber tools or the 
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exchange of services for non-fiscal gains. Others also define cyber mercenaries as groups that 
carry out cyber espionage operations on demand,7 although such definitions generally lack 
specificity. 
According to Robert Knake, the Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on 
Foreign Relations (CFR) and author of The Fifth Domain: Defending Our Country, Our 
Companies, and Ourselves in the Age of Cyber Threats, a cyber mercenary is a criminal actor 
that will engage in offensive cyber operations for any country.8 On the basis of this definition, 
cyber mercenaries may be considered a type of intermediary that contributes to a cyber-attack 
against a target. The use of intermediaries for conflict is common all around the world, and there 
is an opulent body of scholarship that traces the practice of hiring intermediaries, in particular 
mercenaries, throughout the centuries.9 As such, there have been varying definitions of the word 
‘mercenary’ based on different time periods. Scholars generally agree that mercenaries are 
conceptually distinct from other combatants in that they sell their skills to other parties, they are 
not integrated for prolonged periods of time into an armed force, they have not been sent by a 
third-party in an official capacity to assist with wartime efforts, and that they are recruited 
privately to avoid legal detection.10 These attributes may still be applied to cyber mercenaries, 
although they would need to be updated to reflect modern innovation, as well as tied to the 
domain of cyberspace. 
For the purpose of this paper, the authors define cyber mercenaries as intermediate actors 
with cyber-offensive capabilities that unlawfully peddle hacked intelligence, software exploits, 
or technical expertise to a beneficiary in exchange for financial or ideological gain. Beneficiaries 
range from nation-states to multinational corporations and wealthy individuals that gain 
advantage from the activities of these cyber mercenaries. Due to the explicit inclusion of nation-
3
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states as a possible beneficiary, it is necessary to distinguish between state actors and state-
sponsored actors. The authors do not include state actors employed by federal bodies recognized 
by domestic legislation. Contractors in such cases are subject to a notional set of standards and 
regulations that limit their autonomy and ensure that their activities do not breach laws or incite 
crimes. Therefore, contractors under the direction of the National Security Agency (NSA), the 
People Liberation Army (PLA), or the Iranians would not qualify. The authors do, however, 
include actors sponsored by a nation-state via active support or via the government willfully 
ignoring the activities that they conduct within their borders. For this paper, the authors will 
focus on a group of former state actors that were sponsored by a foreign nation-state and a group 
that sought to peddle hacked cyber weaponry. 
Likewise, there are several competing definitions of cyber weapons that take into account 
the physical effects that these weapons cause, the context in which the weapon was used, and the 
intent of the user.11 However, there is no international consensus regarding the definition of 
cyber weapons, rather, only the generic concept of ‘weapon’ is defined.12 Even the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms does not define 
cyber weapons, although they have updated their list of terms to include several cyberspace-
related jargon.13 A traditional weapon is largely understood to be any device designed to “kill, 
injure, or disable people, or to damage or destroy property.”14 While cyber weapons have the 
capacity to harm groups and institutions en masse, the traditional definition of weapons does not 
encapsulate the diverse codes and software that have the potential to, but may not be used to 
inflict physical harm, thus intent and outcome play a crucial role in whether a malicious code 
should be deemed a weapon. 
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Technology and National Security Specialist Clay Wilson, in a 2006 Congressional 
Research Service report defines cyber weapons as “computer programs capable of disrupting the 
data storage or processing logic of enemy computers.”15 This definition, however, appears 
unconvincing for being under-inclusive. A cyber weapon defined by a simple capacity for 
inflicting harm or its possession of one or more offensive capabilities, in contrast, is over-
inclusive and lacks the specificity necessary for legal regulation. Thomas Rid and Peter 
McBurney in their article, “Cyber Weapons,” consider cyber weapons to be computer codes 
“used, or designed to be used, with the aim of threatening or causing physical, functional, or 
mental harm to structures, systems, or living things.”16 Their emphasis on intent is crucial, since 
technology may be repurposed for malicious use. In their view, a tool is a weapon when it is 
intended to be used as such. It is necessary then to consider both the outcome that the tool is 
designed to produce and the intent of the user to apply it in a manner that comports with its 
offensive capability. Intent, however, is a difficult element to measure and can raise several 
liability concerns.  
Cyber Intelligence Research Director of the Italian Military of Defense Stefano Mele in 
his article, “Legal Considerations on Cyber-Weapons and their Definitions,” provides a specific 
legal definition of cyber weapons within the context of warfare. Mele defines cyber weapons as 
“a part of equipment, a device, or any set of computer instructions, used in a conflict among 
actors both national and non-national, with the purpose of causing (directly or otherwise) 
physical damage to objects or people, or of sabotaging and/or damaging in a direct way the 
information systems of a sensitive target of the attacked subject.”17 Mele contends that a weapon 
can be an abstract concept, therefore program codes or computer instructions designed to inflict 
harm may be considered a weapon when used in specific circumstances. For the purpose of this 
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paper, the authors offer a tapered definition of cyber weapons that aligns with Stefano Mele’s 
explanation in order to narrow the scope of discussion—cyber weapons are programs and 
software designed and used to deliver destructive outcomes on systems or networks. Destructive 
outcomes include manipulation, denials, disruption, degradation, and destruction. 
This paper presents an explicit definition of cyber mercenaries and an overview of the 
reasons why nation-states might hire them. It considers the potential risks that cyber mercenaries 
pose and expands an existing framework for how nation-states might influence global actors that 
employ them. This paper is divided into five parts. The first examines the aspects of the Internet 
that allow cybercriminals to thrive, as well as the danger of privatized cyber capabilities in an 
increasingly plugged-in world. The second considers specific cyber mercenary groups based on 
the working definition outlined by the authors. Owing to the range of possibilities, this paper 
focuses on the motives and capabilities of two—Project Raven and the Shadow Brokers. These 
two groups were chosen to show variance among cyber mercenaries and their potential 
beneficiaries. They were analyzed based on what services or tools they peddled to beneficiaries 
and what they sought to gain in exchange. The third part of this paper analyzes the implications 
of the democratization and affordable access to information technology. The fourth considers an 
existing state-proxy framework, and the final segment provides recommendations for the future. 
The Internet and Commercialized Cyber Capabilities 
The Internet is a powerful mode of idea sharing and communication that is easily 
accessible to anyone with the means and the ability to operate it. In recent times, cyberspace has 
become a geopolitical arena that has resulted in the emergence of new channels of conflict and 
more intricate warfare tactics. The influence of independent actors and the offensive 
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competencies of small countries that lack large, physical militaries have been amplified as a 
result.  
Accessibility and anonymity, two of the Internet’s most prominent features, have made it 
possible for adversaries to inflict tremendous social and economic harm.18 Former Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs Madelyn Creedon argues that the “low barriers 
of entry in cyberspace allow a range of adversaries to have effective capabilities against 
networks and computer systems, unlike those anywhere else—here, cyber criminals, proxies for 
hire, and terrorists could leverage capabilities that previously only governments possessed.”19 
The openness of the online world, coupled with the privatization of offensive cyber skills raises 
concerns regarding liability and the loss of state control over cyber weaponry. The challenge of 
identifying those responsible—otherwise known as the ‘attribution problem’—for cyber-attacks 
only adds fuel to the fire. Hackers are skilled at covering their tracks and may even plant 
evidence that implicates an innocent party.20 The ‘Ghostnet’ hacker organization located in 
China for instance, which infiltrated political agencies and media companies worldwide. Even 
though authorities in affected countries knew where the attacks were coming from, they could 
not determine whether the computers being used were the actual computers of those responsible 
or previously infected computers used as relay points from a different location.21 
States have begun to exploit these two web characteristics by outsourcing their virtual 
operations to third parties in order to achieve broader (often political) objectives. For the right 
price, countries, multinational corporations, and even wealthy individuals can purchase digital 
intelligence services and illicit access to high profile victims in a manner “akin to purchasing off-
the-shelf elements of the National Security Agency or the Mossad.”22 The use of proxies for 
conflict between states is not a new strategy. Examples can be found all throughout history; the 
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Barbary pirates used by the Ottoman Empire or the Viet Cong supported by China and the USSR 
for instance. The expansion of the virtual world caused by more people gaining access to the 
Internet and current systems within the three main economic sectors (i.e. primary, secondary, and 
tertiary) changing from manual to digital incentivizes both state and non-state actors to exploit 
the cyber realm for their own purposes.  
States may opt to hire cyber mercenaries for several reasons. On top of allowing them to 
maintain some semblance of deniability, cyber mercenaries permit them from engaging in direct 
conflict with an adversary. Indirect skirmishes may reduce casualties, costs, as well as domestic 
social repercussions such as a loss of electoral support in democratic societies. Furthermore, 
cyber mercenaries oftentimes have more experience using sophisticated technology than new 
cyber divisions established by the government. This gap incentivizes nation-states to take 
advantage of a cyber mercenary’s previously learned skills. 
The entrepreneurial state-sponsorship of cyber mercenaries underscores the dangers of 
non-obvious warfare, which is defined by Senior Management Scientist for RAND Corporation 
Martin Libicki as conflict where, “the identity of the warring side and even the very fact of 
warfare are completely ambiguous.”23 Ambiguity is a cause for doubt, which in turn breeds 
hesitance. Should a victim be unable to pinpoint an aggressor with confidence, then the victim 
might hesitate to respond.24 Alternatively, even if the victim is certain of the culprit, without 
physical evidence, the globalization of politics and domestic news has resulted in a certain 
degree of caution. Should other world leaders have divergent opinions on who conducted a 
cyber-attack—or if the act can even be considered one—then the victim might again choose to 
subdue, or completely hold off, its response. In addition to identification issues, the shroud of 
anonymity may afford cyber mercenaries the opportunity to engage in other illicit activities. 
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They could even utilize the national resources of their state sponsors to fund these criminal 
undertakings. 
Obscurity is arguably one of the cyber domain’s greatest strengths. Although tracing 
network details like the Internet Protocol (IP) address might allow nations to determine the 
physical location of those perpetrating a cyber-attack that does not equate to locating the 
individual or group responsible. Hackers are not bound by geographic borders, nor do they need 
to be within the confines of their home state to carry out an invasive cyber operation. The 
Bangladesh Bank Cyber Heist is an example of the sweeping range of hackers and the 
complications that third parties can bring. In 2016, hackers from the Lazarus Group linked an IP 
address in North Korea to a server in Europe, which they used to control systems that they had 
already infected in an attempt to steal $951 million from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
account that belonged to the Bangladesh Central Bank.25 Security hackers gradually familiarized 
themselves with the bank’s daily procedures, before sending fraudulent instructions for thirty-
five high dollar transactions via the SWIFT network, which is a global information system used 
by thousands of financial institutions for monetary transactions.26 While the hackers only 
managed to get five of their orders through, the orders totaled $101 million. Due to a spelling 
error in one of the transfers, one transaction for $20 million was halted.27 Cybersecurity experts 
concluded that North Korea was closely linked to the hackers that carried out the Bangladesh 
Bank attack, but the lack of immediate certainty stalled a response.  
This not only undermined confidence in the safety of international transactions and the 
Federal Reserve, but also showcased the strategic advantages of empowering cyber mercenaries 
to conduct malicious activities. The South and North Korean governments established the 
Chosun Expo Joint Venture— also known as the Korea Expo Joint Venture (KEJP)—as an e-
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commerce and lottery website.28 When South Korea pulled out of the undertaking, North Korea 
continued operating the company. They expanded into different online enterprises and eventually 
used it as a front to hire hackers like Park Jin Hyok, who carried out an assortment of global 
cyber-attacks, heists, and intrusions, including the Bangladesh Bank Cyber Heist.29 KEJP 
maintained its distance from the North Korean government, but still committed atrocities by 
collaborators working on their behalf. By allowing hackers like Park Jin Hyok to carry out these 
type of operations, North Korea managed to use his unique skillset to their advantage and deny 
knowledge of his actions when he was charged. 
Given advancements in cyber security, groups remaining within compromised networks 
for months on end to steal information has become increasingly unlikely to go unnoticed for 
long. Due to this, more cyber mercenaries are likely to use precise hit-and-run approaches, where 
they only steal the information that is required from their targets and then abandon the network. 
The Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group Icefog, for example, which focuses on attacking 
governmental institutions, tech and media companies, and telecom and satellite operators in 
Japan and South Korea.30 An analysis of Icefog’s attacks show that they were unusually focused; 
necessary files were identified, transferred, and then the targeted machine was abandoned. 
Despite the relative simplicity of their attacks, their hit-and-run tactics have successfully 
compromised several hundred targets. 
The lack of central regulation governing cyberspace also allows cyber mercenaries to 
thrive. Stratfor global analyst Matthew Bey notes, “The absence of a global rules-based system 
means that the differences in laws, regulations, and litigation practices from state to state will 
only grow as countries try to exert greater control over the Internet.”31 While there have been 
efforts to introduce a series of fundamental norms that encourage the peaceful use of cyberspace 
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such as those proposed by the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, no 
intergovernmental organizations formally regulate the Internet, and consequently, the extensive 
field of cyber warfare. The lack of both an organizing body and transnational legislation 
contributes to the struggles that governments face when defending their national interests in the 
face of exploitive online aggressors.  
This is not just an international issue; American laws overseeing digital warfare are not 
adequately equipped to address the speed of technological innovation or the privatization of 
specialized cyber capabilities.32 In a New York Times article, reporters describe current American 
laws that control what former U.S. intelligence personnel can and cannot provide to foreign 
governments as “murky, outdated, and ill-equipped” and “meant to keep a leash on 20th-century 
warfare.”33 In other words, they do not comprise cyber skills that can be self-taught or learned 
from formal government agencies, and then further refined from anywhere in the world.  
Addressing digital warfare requires an understanding of complex, continuously 
transforming technology.34 Part of the security risks in the virtual world stems from the blurred 
lines between conventional warfare and cyberwarfare. What constitutes a threat has become 
more ambiguous, since the use of cyber weaponry does not fit traditional criterion of conflict. 
The international standards that determine whether entering a war is just (jus ad bellum) and 
regulations that outline the actions of wartime participants (jus in bello) provides little guidance 
about the legality of cyber-attacks or when such an attack becomes an act of war.35 The many 
emerging types of cyber-attacks, as well as those that have only been hypothesized, also requires 
consideration. Several scholars have examined how existing laws, doctrines, and ethical 
principles might be applied to the virtual world, but none of them fully encompass the broad 
range of potential tools which may be used to cause harm.36 Clear-cut determinations are crucial 
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for nation-states to evaluate offensive cyber operations, so that they might respond in a 
proportionate manner. 
Cyberspace offers extensive opportunities for actors with advanced capabilities. If 
nothing is done to improve current capabilities of identifying, holding accountable, and 
sanctioning cyber mercenaries, as well as the states that contract their services, then governments 
that seek to covertly attack competitors without fully committing to the high cost of training or 
maintaining a digital army may continue to view cyber mercenaries as an easy, private 
alternative.37 
Cyber Mercenary Group Examples 
Group 1: Project Raven 
Founded in 2009, Project Raven is a clandestine team made up of former intelligence 
operatives from the U.S. National Security Agency that were contracted to assist the United Arab 
Emirates in surveillance operations targeting political competitors, suspected terrorists, 
journalists, and human rights activists. According to a special report by Reuters, Raven is based 
in a converted mansion in Abu Dhabi known as the Villa.38 Employing skills learned during their 
time spent serving in the U.S. intelligence community, Raven operatives utilized a wide range of 
cyber tools and methods to carry out covert cyber operations against a variety of targets chosen 
by UAE security forces. Early missions ranged from targeting users of Islamic Internet forums to 
assisting the UAE’s National Electronic Security Authority (NESA) with combatting local 
terrorist networks like ISIS.39 Operations ramped up in 2015 when agents were tasked to create 
malicious software like computer viruses that would infect website visitors en masse.  
American operatives developed a strategy whereby missions would be handled in a step-
by-step process. Every step was managed by a specific department or team. Together, these 
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divisions worked to conduct sophisticated cyber-attacks against Raven targets specified by 
NESA. The functions of each department are outlined below.40 
• Operations – conducted hacking missions;  
• Management – gathered relevant information on the identified target/s;  
• Infrastructure – anonymously rented servers for Raven operatives to launch untraceable 
cyber-attacks;  
• Targeting – scouted a target’s devices and online accounts for vulnerabilities; developed 
suitable attacks to exploit a target’s accounts; identified the target’s associates and 
relatives for surveillance; and 
• Initial Access Development – provided the Operations team with the necessary hacking 
tools. 
 
   Lori Stroud, a former intelligence analyst that left the NSA after backlash from the Edward 
Snowden leaks, joined Project Raven in 2014. She was officially employed as a contractor for 
the Baltimore-based cybersecurity firm, CyberPoint, which managed Project Raven for the UAE. 
In 2014, CyberPoint wrote a letter to the Department of Justice stating that their organization 
focused only on, “defend[ing] their [clients] critical systems and infrastructure from advanced 
exploitation techniques and the kinds of sophisticated threats where commodity solutions are 
inadequate.”41 Part of the ambiguity in cyberspace stems from the lack of distinction between 
cyberdefense and cyberoffense. However, the design and subsequent deployment of computer 
viruses that attack website visitors indiscriminately—as carried out by Project Raven in 2015—
clearly does not fall under the former. Such wholesale attacks have the potential to affect the data 
and communication of citizens across the globe. Despite this, CyberPoint continues to present 
itself as a company focused solely on cyberdefense.42 
Working in tandem with managers, Stroud assisted in crafting a policy by which Raven 
operatives must mark any data of potential American victims for deletion, and then notify others 
to remove them from subsequent collection.43 Predictably, the flagged information continued to 
reappear in Raven’s data caches. It was not until 2017 that Stroud discovered a targeting queue 
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filled with Americans, which had been limited to Emirati intelligence officers by Raven 
leadership. Even when Americans were not the direct target, legality was a recurrent concern for 
former U.S. agents because of the gray zones that cyber operations often fall into. For example, 
when hacking into the social media profiles or email accounts of non-Americans, the possibility 
of needing to break into servers located within the U.S. still exists.44 
The most prominent cyber tool used by Project Raven was the espionage program Karma, 
which allowed agents to remotely access a user’s iPhone. Karma was acquired by the UAE 
government from an undisclosed seller outside of the country.45 Whether the seller engineered 
Karma or merely acted as a middleman is unknown, but without the creator of the tool present, 
Raven operatives only partially understood how Karma functioned. Karma exploited an 
undisclosed weakness in Apple’s iMessage application, thus limiting the program’s effect to 
Apple devices. Despite this restriction, it proved to be more valuable than other hacking tools 
because it did not require targets to directly download malware. Instead, Raven operatives could 
gain access to texts, emails, and even photographs by simply uploading phone numbers or email 
addresses into a preconfigured system. Between 2016 and 2017, Karma was successfully used 
against hundreds of targets, including prominent figures and journalists like the current Emir of 
Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, the chief editor of the Al-Arab newspaper Abdullah 
Al-Athba, the Al-Jazeera Chairman Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer bin Mohammed Al Thani, and 
more.46 
Technically capable individuals or groups that develop sophisticated cyber weapons, and 
then sell them on the underground market have the potential to undermine global security. That 
the UAE was able to privately purchase such a potent tool alludes to a broader issue related to 
the commercialization of cyber weapons and how cyber mercenaries operate on the global stage. 
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Unlike state intelligence agencies that are often bound by agreements and conventional protocol 
in order to maintain positive multilateral relations, cyber mercenaries can act with more freedom. 
Additionally, cyber mercenaries often have little regard for the institutions that they are tasked to 
target because of other driving factors like monetary gain, which makes them perfect for 
conducting high-risk cyber operations. It is important to note, however, that the motivations of 
hackers are affected by a multitude of factors—all of which inevitably affect the type of cyber 
actions that they conduct and where they draw the line in terms of espionage. For Project Raven, 
many foreign operatives were likely driven by the lucrative salary offered by the UAE. Analysts 
like Stroud were reportedly paid upwards of $200,000 a year, while managers were paid over 
$400,000.47  
The initial idea behind recruiting American contractors was to build-up Abu Dhabi’s 
intelligence apparatus until Emirati specialists were capable of taking over. Outsourcing talent, 
as opposed to training individuals in-house, is done in many labor markets, not just those related 
to cyberspace. It allows organizations to tap the international talent pool for experienced 
individuals that can produce a greater quality of work in a more efficient, cost-effective manner. 
However,  concern rose in 2015 when the UAE reportedly “grew more uncomfortable with a 
core national security program being run by foreigners.”48 Control over Project Raven shifted 
from CyberPoint to a domestic Emirati company called DarkMatter, which was founded in 2014 
by Faisal al-Bannai, the creator of the mobile phone retailer Axiom Telecom.49 Faisal al-Bannai 
has repeatedly denied any claims against DarkMatter for offensive hacking, zero-day exploits, or 
attempts to recruit foreign intelligence specialists for offensive cyber operations,50 underscoring 
the difficulty of attribution and accountability in cyberspace. 
15
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Cyber weapons are proliferating, and control over them is not limited to the world’s 
superpowers. Project Raven is an example of how small nations that lack large, physical 
militaries can amplify their offensive competencies to affect a range of virtual and physical 
communities or institutions. Furthermore, Project Raven illustrates the growing influence of 
intermediates acting within cyberspace, particularly the threat that former, highly-trained 
intelligence agents can pose when they are recruited by foreign organizations. The 
transformation of cyber warfare into a commodity has made it possible for anyone with the 
available resources to command advanced attacks against regional powers or other political 
adversaries. 
Other highly-publicized cyber-attacks against recognized organizations in recent years, 
such as Sony Entertainment, Target, Yahoo, and J.P. Morgan Chase, has limned the need for 
organizations to hire individuals with cybersecurity expertise—demand, however, far outpaces 
supply.51 According to a 2019 Cybersecurity Workforce Study by the International Information 
System Security Certification Consortium or (ISC)², the cybersecurity workforce gap in the U.S. 
is nearly 500,000.52 This shortage can, expectedly, exacerbate cybersecurity issues, such as the 
number of data breaches within an institution. Since 2006, the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) has compiled a record of significant cyber incidents that focuses 
specifically on successful attacks carried out against federal agencies and businesses resulting in 
economic losses of over one million dollars.53 From May 2006 to December 2010, the CSIS 
recorded seventy-five major cyber incidents. The following years until December 2017, it 
recorded 240 incidents. In 2018 alone, it recorded 104. A review of the upward surge in major 
incidents throughout the years, as well as the escalating financial costs outlined within each, 
alludes to the growing capabilities and boldness of cyber criminals. 
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Group 2: The Shadow Brokers (TSB) 
The Shadow Brokers are an elite hacker group that first surfaced in August of 2016. They 
captivated the attention of media outlets and intelligence agencies across the globe when they 
started a public auction for computer exploits and hacking tools that they claimed to have stolen 
from one of the most sophisticated cyber-attack groups in the world, the Equation Group, which 
is believed to be linked to the U.S. National Security Agency.54 The Equation Group has been 
described by journalists and security specialists as “omnipotent,” the “Crown Creator of Cyber-
Espionage,” and the “apex predator of the APT world.”55 
TSB communicates by sharing links via Twitter, where they operate under the handle 
@theshadowbrokerss. Their motives have been widely speculated about, from retribution against 
President Donald Trump to a desire to publicly humiliate the NSA and stir internal chaos within 
the agency.56 Their name, however, gives away one surefire drive—financial gain. It also 
provides insight into their initial desire to hold auctions for hacked data. The moniker references 
a fictional character from the video game series, Mass Effect. Founder of Comaelo Technologies, 
Matthieu Suiche, provides a description of the Shadow Broker from the game: 
“… an individual at the head of an expansive organization which trades in 
information, always selling to the highest bidder. The Shadow Broker appears to 
be highly competent at its trade: all secrets that are bought and sold never allow 
one customer of the Broker to gain a significant advantage, forcing the customers 
to continue trading information to avoid becoming disadvantaged…”57 
 
Often, when hackers manage to access an adversary’s cyber weaponry, they go to great lengths 
not to put themselves in the limelight. TSB instead opted to disclose their hacked caches, 
effectively releasing high-quality hacking tools into the public sphere. Since their appearance, 
TSB has published a total of four relevant leaks that contain a trove of cyber apparatuses from 
the NSA. Computer security specialist Bruce Shneier states that all of the current material 
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released by TSB was collected in 2013 “from an external NSA staging server, a machine that is 
owned, leased, or otherwise controlled by the U.S., but with no connection to the agency… the 
Shadow Brokers successfully hacked one of those caches.”58 Although the collection might seem 
outdated, custom-built hacking tools—particularly those designed by sophisticated attack 
groups—can be repurposed and used for years into the future. Randall Dipert considers the issue 
of repurposing software in his article, “The Ethics of Cyberwarfare,” where he states that due to 
cyber weapons having no exotic components—unlike other advanced technological weapons 
such as biological—any computer is a potential cyber weapon.59 Technology is constantly 
evolving. The potential of tools and programs to cause harm if restructured is a vital point to 
consider, and a major reason why adaptive techniques that take into account possible scenarios 
of varying significance are necessary. 
The first leak by TSB was a data teaser that included a PasteBin page60 with an invitation 
to an “Equations Group Cyber Weapons Auction,” links to two encrypted archives, and auction 
instructions. To show their candor, the password for the first archive—which contained about 
300MB of data—was given for free. According to Secure Trading Security Advisor Mustafa Al-
Bassam, the cache contained “a set of exploits, implants, and tools for hacking firewalls.”61 The 
second archive, in contrast, was put up for auction. Also on their PasteBin page, TSB indicated 
that if they managed to reach their one million Bitcoin (BTC) goal, then they would dump more 
Equation Group files. However, after a series of low offers TSB called off the auction. 
The second leak contained a list of foreign servers that were allegedly hacked by the 
Equation Group between 2000 and 2010, as well as a list of confidential cyber weapons.62 
Accompanying the information was a message that disjointedly called for the disruption of the 
2016 U.S. presidential election.63 The third, unlike previous leaks, included a message addressed 
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to President Donald Trump. TSB wrote that the leak was their “form of protest” against him for 
not upholding his campaign promises.64 The end of the communication contained the password 
for the encrypted archive that TSB failed to auction during their first leak in 2016. This archive 
stored more hacking tools that could potentially compromise Unix and Linux operating systems. 
The fourth leak is the most vital. It contained an array of what was originally thought to 
be zero-day exploits that predominantly targeted outdated versions of Microsoft Windows. Zero-
day exploits target software vulnerabilities that manufacturers are unaware of.65 When a hacker 
discovers and exploits these flaws, manufacturers would have “zero-days” to patch the issue.66 In 
the wrong hands, zero-day exploits can be modified to destroy computer networks and steal 
information.67 For example, Doublepulsar infected hundreds of thousands of computers mere 
weeks after TSB’s leak. The NSA toolkit also contained the EternalBlue exploit that was used in 
tandem with Doublepulsar to conduct the WannaCry ransomware attack in May 2017. 
WannaCry crippled computers in over 150 countries and affected the operations of over fifty 
organizations. Economic loss estimates ranged from millions to billions of dollars.68 
Additionally, EternalBlue in conjunction with another leaked exploit, EternalRomance, and the 
hacking tool Mimikatz, were used to help propagate NotPetya malware one month after 
WannaCry. The NotPetya attack was dubbed the “most devastating cyber-attack in history” and 
resulted in damages of over $10 billion.69 The un-redacted release of executable codes by the 
TSB harmed thousands of Internet users around the globe. 
Notably, Microsoft released security patches addressing the targeted vulnerabilities a 
month before the TSB leaked them in April.70 However devices that run older, unsupported 
versions of Windows or users that tinker with essential updating features on their personal 
devices remained vulnerable. Computers in larger organizations that tend to lag behind patch 
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schedules because of internal compatibility testing by administrators also remained at risk. 
Exploits effectively deliver malicious payloads, and are thus in high-demand by cybercriminals 
and other actors. The potential circulation of advanced cyber weaponry to third parties that either 
have the skills to use them or the means to hire individuals capable of doing so gives these 
parties the ability to cause immense destruction to a nation’s infrastructure.  
Implications 
The democratization and affordable accessibility of information technology in the 
twenty-first century means that the only safe computers are the ones that remain unconnected  to 
the World Wide Web. Nation-states must do whatever they can to protect their critical 
infrastructure (CI) against acts of terrorism, sabotage, or hacking by criminal elements. While the 
debate continues between the private sector and the government regarding who is ultimately 
responsible for protecting our CI, “illegal activities ignore national boundaries, ignore private-
public distinctions, and leverage the public infrastructure to exploit its vulnerabilities.”71 The 
private-public sectors must come together “to effectively defend the information infrastructure” 
and “mitigate their impact effectively.”72 
Another important implication of the democratization of cyberspace, as the authors have 
previously stated, is the proliferation of non-state actors after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Given the porous borders of nation-states in the modern world, non-state actors constitute a 
growing concern for policy makers. Naval War College Chair of Science, Space, & Technology 
Joan Johnson-Freese in her essay, “A Space Mission Force for the Global Commons of Space,” 
states that, “driven by such factors as economics and political ideology, non-state actors are more 
likely to deny, restrict, or disrupt common access and usage in pursuit of their objectives.” 73 
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The accessibility of cyberspace has also made less powerful nations view the Internet in a 
different light. They see cyber-power as a force multiplier and a part of their military arsenal 
when dealing with more powerful nations, including but not limited to, the United States, Russia, 
and China. Developing countries or rising powers such as India, Iran, and Brazil have developed 
their own cyber forces. While some developing nations may choose to cultivate their own cyber 
capable workforce, others may hire or recruit criminal elements to conduct their dirty deeds. As 
RAND senior engineer Dave Baiocchi and RAND engineering director William Welser states, 
“criminal syndicates could use satellites to monitor the patterns of law enforcement in order to 
elude capture, or a junta could use them to track rivals after a coup.”74 With the rise of 
plutocratic insurgency within the turbulent, interdependent world economy, criminal elements or 
syndicates have become the go to for nation-states and corrupt political leaders. While we 
traditionally think of insurgency as a rebel force attempting to overthrow the government, 
plutocratic insurgency aims to “carve out de facto zones of autonomy for themselves by crippling 
the state’s ability to constrain their freedom of (economic) actions.”75 As Sarah Chayes 
demonstrates in her seminal book, Thieves of State, when corrupt politicians join forces with 
criminal syndicates, it is nation-states that end up paying the price because corruption threatens 
national and global security.76 
Furthermore, American jurisprudence currently lags behind the advancement of cyber 
technology. U.S. laws do not translate well into the realm of cyberspace. At present, U.S. laws 
adequately address conventional forms of warfare, but when it comes to handling the growing 
number of sophisticated cyber-attacks, they have been painfully insufficient. As Senior Fellow at 
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies Melissa Hathaway points out, “wherever data is stored, it 
21
da Cruz and Pedron: Cyber Mercenaries
Published by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository,
falls under the legal paradigm of that country. That includes the privacy laws. The U.S. does not 
have a single federal, government-wide data-breach law.”77  
Criminal enterprises and cyber mercenaries are also taking advantage of the 
democratization of technology to spread disinformation on the behavior of patrons in their 
patron-client relationship. Cyber is part of a nation’s national power; it acts as a force multiplier 
in political warfare. Political warfare, as defined by George Kennan in the 1948 State 
Department memorandum: Organizing Political Warfare, is “the employment of all the means at 
a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objective.”78 One way cyber enhances a 
nation’s political warfare is through the use of deepfakes. As law professors Robert Chesney and 
Danielle Citron argue, “deepfakes [are] highly realistic and difficult-to-detect digital 
manipulations of audio or video—it is becoming easier than ever to portray someone saying or 
doing something he or she never said or did.”79 Deepfakes allow for information cascades, 
especially in the realm of politics. Chesney and Citron suggest that when information cascades 
are utilized, “people pass information shared by others without bothering to check if it is true, 
making it appear more credible in the process.”80 When deepfakes become part of the democratic 
process, it creates political discord and resentment among voters and devalues the rule of law. 
Furthermore, all news, either legitimate or not, becomes “fake news” thus creating confusion 
among the electorate. As retired Reserve Colonel S.G. Chekinov and General-Lieutenant S.A. 
Bodanov argues, “the mass media today can stir up chaos and confusion in government and 
military management of any country and instill ideas of violence, treachery, and immorality, and 
demoralize the public. Put through this treatment, the armed forces personnel and public of any 
country will not be ready for active defense.”81  
22
International Social Science Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 2 [], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol96/iss2/3
Finally, while nation-states may employ cyber mercenaries as a way to avoid attribution 
or responsibility, there are some unintended consequences that must be seriously considered. 
Despite nation-states aggressively investing in their own cyber warriors, criminal syndicates and 
cyber criminals remain two steps ahead of law enforcement agencies. Cyber mercenaries may 
also be more technologically-prepared, and they enjoy the advantages of operating without the 
constraints of the rule of law or fear of prosecution. As U.S. Army War College Professor Steven 
Metz points out, “mercenaries became strategically important when they are more skilled than 
the fighters that states were able to keep under arms.”82  Metz focuses upon two key factors 
regarding the privatization of security—loyalty and discipline. He emphasizes the long-standing 
difficulties of keeping loyalty and discipline within professional military forces; therefore it is 
even more difficult to promote loyalty and discipline within cyber mercenaries that have no 
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State and Proxy Relationships 
 
Figure 1: Shaping Proxy Relationships through DIME(LE) 
 
 
States that seek to transform their relationship or the relationship between other states and 
their cyber mercenaries might apply the elements outlined in the DIME(LE) model constructed 
by Tim Maurer.83 This model covers several types of soft and hard power that governments have 
at their disposal, including diplomacy, information, military, economy, and law enforcement. 
The first involves engaging in international forums or the issuance of statements that urge heads 
of state to take action. The second and fifth elements work in tandem with one another; they 
concern the wilful spread of critical information and the public release of evidence by local law 
enforcement agencies. Both of these strategies essentially try to turn public opinion against the 
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state that the attack originated from. The third element, military force, is used to undermine trust 
between the state and its proxy through the exploitation of any power imbalances in their 
relationship. Lastly, economic sanctions may be imposed on a nation-state in a blatant attempt to 
force it to change its behavior.  
The DIME(LE) model has distinguishable short-term and long-term goals. As shown in 
the figure above, in the short-term these elements may be used to alter a state’s view towards 
risk, ultimately pushing the state towards greater restraint. In the long-term, how a state handles 
their proxy relationships may fundamentally shift to an arrangement where the state has more 
control over the proxy. It is important to take into account the risks associated with attempting to 
influence a state’s proxy relationships, particularly if a government chooses to utilize a forceful 
element of the DIME(LE) framework, such as overt military action or economic sanctions. The 
priorities of cyber mercenaries often don’t align with the priorities of their employers. Moreover, 
many cyber mercenaries do not have significant—if any—assets, which can make them harder 
for states to control in heated situations. Failing to regard vital factors in the bilateral relationship 
between a state and their proxy could result in unintended consequences ranging from severed 
trust and a loss of control over the cyber group to active state-sponsorship of similar 
organizations.  
The authors of this paper suggest the incorporation of a sixth element when considering 
cyber mercenaries—cyber sanctions, which would be specifically aimed at identified groups or 
individuals responsible for or complicit in cyber-attacks. Sanctions would include travel 
restrictions, fines, incarceration, and the freezing or seizure of any assets. The inclusion of cyber 
sanctions can increase tensions between cyber mercenaries and their sponsors when they are 
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tasked to perform high-risk cyber operations. It may also deter future hackers and interested 
backers from aligning themselves with one another. 
Conclusion 
The rise of cyberspace transformed the conduction of warfare. Actors now have more 
tools to engage each other anonymously, indirectly, and across vast distances at a relatively 
lower cost. Nation-states that do not have the means to sustain large military forces can opt to 
hire or buy sophisticated cyber weapons from cyber mercenaries to amplify their power on the 
international stage. Cyber mercenaries can thus pose a security risk to countries that seek to 
maintain an asymmetrical advantage or to organizations that want to keep destructive cyber tools 
from proliferating. Nation-states can affect state-proxy relationships in a variety of ways, from 
spreading critical information online to applying trade embargoes or economic sanctions. Such 
tactics may also be helpful in deterring states from sponsoring cyber mercenaries or keeping 
hacker groups from forming relationships with certain parties. The lack of international law or 
governing institutions directly dealing with cyber incidents, as well as the variance of domestic 
legislation, results in a degree of ambiguity when the victims of a cyber-attack seek to retaliate in 
a proportionate way. Furthermore, current laws that describe what former intelligence personnel 
with the ability to build or operate dangerous codes and software are woefully underdeveloped in 
most countries. This lack of codified regulation may result in issues further down the line.  
The proliferation of cyber-attacks in recent years necessitates the integration of 
cybersecurity at all stages of future systems development. In order to address the unique hazards 
posed by cyber mercenaries, heightened government oversight over intelligence agencies in the 
form of sweeping contract reviews, more intensive reporting requirements, and more profound 
information sharing might curb the risks associated with hiring outside talent. Since private 
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companies own networks and other critical infrastructure, the government cannot reduce national 
vulnerability to cyber-attacks on their own.84 They may, however, be able to utilize existing legal 
authorities to their fullest capacity. For example, the U.S. Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act signed by 
President George W. Bush on October 26, 2001, also known as the PATRIOT Act, facilitates 
information-sharing among agencies and grants law enforcement increased surveillance 
capabilities. If combined with Title 18 of the U.S. Code—which concerns America’s criminal 
procedures—it may be used to monitor individuals that visit specific websites or access high-
value information.85 
Increased prioritization and investment by legislators into cybersecurity infrastructure is 
necessary. The creation of digital outreach teams that conduct frequent media blitzes in order to 
stimulate public opinion or remove confidential information spread by non-state actors on social 
media platforms may deter hacker groups from conducting certain activities. The passage of 
updated legislation encompassing the various aspects of cyber warfare would also be game-
changing for agencies and courts attempting to navigate the litigation process. In addition, 
broadening intelligence networks and crafting a comprehensive (domestic and international) 
legal framework focused specifically on addressing cyber-attacks will alleviate some of the 
ambiguity when it comes to identification and response. Such an extensive security overhaul, 
however, is time consuming and may be met with broad political opposition. Until such 
procedures are established, states might begin augmenting their regulatory practices by first 
determining the fundamental operations that should only be performed by government 
institutions, particularly those closely tied to public safety. This, in turn, will establish clear 
boundaries regarding which functions may be delegated to third parties. Appropriate attention to 
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legal definitions of cyber mercenaries and cyber weapons are also vital for governments to begin 
addressing these urgent issues. 
Most importantly, nation-states must acknowledge that they cannot address the danger of 
privatized cyber capabilities unilaterally. In the globalized and interdependent world of the post-
cold war, global cooperation is essential in crafting effective regulatory structures for borderless 
hackers that have the capacity to impact societies via the Internet. International, proactive 
opposition against the employment of cyber mercenaries and plainly outlined sanctions for those 
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